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DOES THE TAX INJUNCTION ACT OF 1937 AFFECT
STATE COURT JURISDICTION OVER STATE TAX
CHALLENGES UNDER SECTION 1983 OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1871?
The Tax Injunction Act of 1937 (the Act) prohibits federal courts from
hearing challenges to state taxes when a state court can provide to the
challenger a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy.' Although the Act forces
challengers of state taxes into state courts, the challengers often attempt to
plead violations of section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act (section 1983).2

1. See Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). The Tax Injunction Act provides
that:
The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or
collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy
may be had in the courts of such State.
Id.
2. See, e.g., Zizka v. Water Pollution Control Auth., 195 Conn. 682, -, 490 A.2d
509, 510 (1985) (plaintiff challenged under § 1983 town formula for sewer assessment); State
Tax Comm'n v. Fondren, 387 So. 2d 712, 714 (Miss. 1980) (plaintiff brought action under
Mississippi Constitution, fourteenth amendment of United States Constitution, and § 1983,
challenging county ad valorem tax assessment), cert. denied sub nom, Redd v. Lambert, 450
U.S. 1040 (1981); Bung's Bar & Grille, Inc. v. Florence Township Council, 206 N.J. Super.
432, 438, 502 A.2d 1198, 1201 (1985) (plaintiff challenged under New Jersey law and § 1983
local improvement assessment).
Section 1983 provides that any person who, while acting under state authority, deprives
another person of his federal constitutional or statutory rights, is liable to the injured person.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Originally, Congress enacted section 1983 as part of section 1 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (Historical Note, Codification) (West 1981)
(stating that R.S. § 1979 is from Act of April 20, 1871, c. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13); Carter v.
Dist. of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116, 120 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (discussing history of § 1983).
Congress intended section 1983, commonly known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, to protect black
citizens' federal constitutional and statutory rights that the Klan was violating. CONG. GLOBE,
42nd Cong., Ist Sess. 166-67 (1871); see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174 (1961) (discussing
Congressional intent behind § 1983). Congress believed that, although no states were passing
laws that discriminated specifically against black citizens, states were either unwilling or unable
to control the Klan activity. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., Ist Sess. 244 (1871); see Monroe, 365
U.S. at 176 (discussing Congressional intent behind § 1983). In enacting section 1983, Congress
provided an effective cause of action to the victims of Klan activity. Monroe, 365 U.S. at
176. In Monroe v. Pape the United States Supreme Court extended the section 1983 remedies
beyond racial discrimination cases to all constitutional violations. Id. at 172. In FairAssessment in Real Estate Association v. McNary the Supreme Court further extended the section
1983 remedies to taxpayers or anyone else who can prove constitutional or federal rights
violations by any state official acting under state law. Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n
v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 115 (1981); see infra notes 115-23 and accompanying text (discussing
United States Supreme Court's holding in Fair Assessment).
Congress intended section 1983 to do three things. Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida,
457 U.S. 496, 503-07 (1982). First, Congress wanted to insure that plaintiffs who had section
1983 claims had immediate access to federal courts. See id. at 503 (discussing Congress' intent
in enacting § 1983). Second, Congress recognized that state courts might not be as independent
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When successful in a challenge to state taxes, a state court litigant routinely
requests that the defendant municipal officer pay the litigant's reasonable
attorneys' fees. 3 The Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976
(section 1988) 4 permits a plaintiff bringing a section 1983 claim to seek
attorneys' fees. 5 Often the damages that a successful state tax challenger

as federal courts in their assessment of claims against state officials. Id. at 505. Therefore,
Congress provided plaintiffs with an independent fact finder, the federal court. Id. Finally,
Congress wanted to allow civil rights plaintiffs to choose between federal and state forums.
Id. at 506.
Federal courts have recognized that section 1983 does not create any substantive federal
rights. See, e.g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980) (holding that § 1983 creates no
substantive rights); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979)
(finding that § 1983 did not provide to plaintiff any substantive rights); Garcia v. Wilson, 731
F.2d 640, 650 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that § 1983 is solely procedural statute that does not
grant plaintiff any substantive rights). Rather, section 1983 guarantees a forum to an individual
when a state official, acting under color of state law, violates the individual's federal
constitutional or statutory rights. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4. The rights that plaintiffs seek to
vindicate through section 1983 actions are not found in-section 1983, but are found in the
federal constitution or statutes. Id. The section 1983 remedy is supplemental to state law
remedies, although section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust available state remedies
before the plaintiff may pursue his section 1983 claim in federal court. Monroe, 365 U.S. at
183.
Generally, plaintiffs pleading violations under section 1983 have immediate access to a
federal court. See Fair Assessment, 454 U.S. at 104 (discussing § 1983's federal forum
provision). The Tax Injunction Act separates state tax section 1983 claims from other section
1983 claims by precluding federal jurisdiction over state tax challenges. See id. at 107 (explaining
that Act's preclusion of federal forum and § 1983's provision of federal forum conflict); infra
notes 115-23 and accompanying text (discussing United States Supreme Court's explanation in
Fair Assessment of conflict between § 1983 and Act).
3. See Bung's Bar & Grille, Inc. v. Florence Township Council, 206 N.J. Super. 432,
439, 502 A.2d 1198, 1200 (1985) (plaintiff requested counsel fees and costs after prevailing on
challenge to local improvement assessment); Spencer v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 281 S.C.
492, 493, 316 S.E.2d 386, 387 (1984) (same), aff'd by an equally divided court, 471 U.S. 82
(1985) (per curiam).
4. See Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). The
Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976 provides, in part, that:
In any action . . . to enforce . . . section 1983 . . . the court, in its discretion,

may allow the prevailing party

. . .

a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.

Id.
5. Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). Congress
enacted the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976 in response to the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Company v. Wilderness Society. See
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 269 (1975) (holding that
successful plaintiff is not entitled to attorneys' fee award); S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5908, 5909 (stating that Alyeska
was impetus behind enacting § 1988). In Alyeska the United States Supreme Court explained
that only Congress can create exceptions to the American rule governing attorneys' fees.
Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 247. Under the American rule a prevailing party in a lawsuit ordinarily
may not recover attorneys' fees from the losing party. Id. Congress recognized that awards
of attorneys' fees were essential to the effective enforcement of the federal statutes to which
section 1988 applies. S. REP. No. 1011, supra, at 6, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
at 5913. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary noted that many citizens who sue to vindicate
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receives are less than the cost of the litigation. 6 Although a state law may
remedy an unfair tax, when a plaintiff can plead a section 1983 claim in
conjunction with his state law claim, the possibility of recouping the
attorneys' fees under section 1988 makes the state tax challenge economically
feasible.7 Therefore, a state court's refusal to hear a plaintiff's section 1983
claim,'and the court's refusal to award attorneys' fees under section 1988,
effectively can prevent the plaintiff from pursuing state tax litigation and
8
force the plaintiff to continue to pay an unfair tax.
The United States Supreme Court has held that a state court has
jurisdiction to hear general section 1983 claims. 9 State courts, however, have
reached different decisions on the question of whether the state courts'
jurisdiction over general section 1983 claims extends to state tax section
1983 lawsuits.' 0 A majority of state courts that have addressed the issue of
state court jurisdiction over state tax section 1983 claims have held that the
Act precludes state courts and federal courts from entertaining plaintiffs'

their civil rights cannot afford the costs of litigation. Id. at 2, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &

ADmI.

NEws at 5910. Thus, when civil rights litigants were unable to recover from a defendant

reasonable attorneys' fees, the litigants' did not pursue the litigation and state officials continued
to violate the litigants' civil rights. Id.
6. See Taylor, Section 1983 in State Court: A Remedy for Unconstitutional State
Taxation, 95 YALE L.J. 414, 417 (1985) (discussing need for state courts to hear § 1983 state
tax challenges).
7. See, Taylor, supra note 6, at 417 (discussing need for state courts to hear § 1983
state tax challenges). State law remedies available to victims of unfair state taxation do not
provide taxpayers with any economic incentive for vindicating their federal rights. Id. at 415
n.8. Often, courts award to victims of unconstitutional taxation money damages of a much
lower amount than the attorneys' fees that the victims actually incur in challenging the tax.
Id. at 417. If the victims' attorneys' fees will exceed the tax refund that the victim hopes to
recover through litigation, the victim will not pursue the litigation. Id. Thus, the availability
of attorneys' fees to state tax challengers can make the difference between protecting the
federal rights of the taxpayers and allowing violations of taxpayers' rights to go unredressed.
Id.
8. Id.
9. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 n.7 (1980) (holding that state courts
possess jurisdiction concurrently with federal district courts over general § 1983 claims).
-, 490 A.2d 509,
10. See Zizka v. Water Pollution Control Auth., 195 Conn. 682,
513 (1985) (holding that state court can refuse to hear state tax § 1983 claim); Backus v.
Chilivis, 236 Ga. 500, 505, 224 S.E.2d 370, 374 (1976) (holding that state court cannot hear
state tax § 1983 claim); Bung's Bar & Grille, Inc. v. Florence Township Council, 206 N.J.
Super. 432, 461, 502 A.2d 1198, 1214 (1985) (holding that state court should hear state tax §
1983 claim).
Several state courts have heard state tax section 1983 claims. See Beverly Bank v. Board
of Review, 117 Ill. App. 3d 656, 660, 453 N.E.2d 96, 102 (1983) (finding that plaintiffs stated
cause of action under § 1983 in challenge to state tax), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951 (1984);
-, 667 P.2d 879, 888 (1983) (holding
Dutoit v. Board of County Comm'rs, 233 Kan. 995,
that state tax litigant stated cause of action under § 1983); Holden Arboretum v. Kirtland, 19
Ohio App. 3d 125, 125, 483 N.E.2d 167, 168 (1984) (entertaining § 1983 claim against state
admissions tax ordinance); supra, note 2 (discussing distinction between general § 1983 actions
and state tax § 1983 actions).
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section 1983 claims challenging state taxes." Two state courts have held
that the Act automatically does not preclude state court jurisdiction over
state tax section 1983 actions, but rather provides a guideline for state
courts to follow in evaluating the adequacy of state remedies.' 2 These two
courts determined that, if the state remedy is adequate, the state court
should defer to the state remedy." The two courts further determined that,
if the state remedy is inadequate, the state court should apply the federal
remedy that would be available in a federal court because the Act does not
bar federal jurisdiction when the state remedy is inadequate.' 4 Finally, one
court has held that the Act encourages, if not requires, state courts to hear
section 1983 claims against state tax officials and award attorneys' fees
under section 1988.15 The legislative history of the Act, the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Act, and the Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution, all suggest that, to afford taxpayers an
adequate forum for their constitutional claims against state tax officials,
6
state courts should entertain section 1983 suits challenging state taxes.'

11. See Backus v. Chilivis, 236 Ga. 500, 505, 224 S.E.2d 370, 374 (1976) (barring § 1983
challenge to ad valorem tax assessments because state created remedy was plain, speedy, and
efficient); Raschke v. Blancher, 141 Ill. App. 3d 813, 817, 491 N.E.2d 1171, 1174 (1986)
(barring § 1983 challenge to property reassessment because Act bars § 1983 challenge to state
taxes in federal court); State Tax Comm'n v. Fondren, 387 So. 2d 712, 723 (Miss. 1980)
(holding that state court has no jurisdiction to hear § 1983 challenge to ad valorem tax
assessment because Act precludes federal court jurisdiction), cert. denied sub nom, Redd v.
Lambert, 450 U.S. 1040 (1981); Stufflebaum v. Panethiere, 691 S.W.2d 271, 272 (Mo. 1985)
(en banc) (holding that plain, adequate, and complete state law remedy bars state tax § 1983
claim); Strain v. Baryla, No. TSB-H-84(44)S (N.Y. State Tax Comm'n June 1, 1984) (LEXIS,
Sttax library) (holding that Act bars state courts from entertaining state tax § 1983 claims);
Johnston v. Gaston County, 71 N.C. App. 707, 713, 323 S.E.2d 381, 384 (1984) (dismissing
plaintiffs' § 1983 claim in state court because state law remedy was plain, adequate, and
complete); Spencer v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 281 S.C. 492, 497, 316 S.E.2d 386, 38889 (1984) (taxpayer may not circumvent state remedies by invoking § 1983), aff'd by an equally

divided Court, 471 U.S. 82 (1985) (per curiam).
12. See Zizka v. Water Pollution Control Auth., 195 Conn. 682, _,

490 A.2d 509,

513 (1985) (holding that Act provides guidelines for state courts to follow in developing
jurisdictional bar to state tax § 1983 claims in state court); Linderkamp v. Bismarck School
Dist. No. 1, 397 N.W.2d 76, 79 (N.D. 1986) (same); see also infra notes 49-58 and accompanying
text (discussing Linderkamp decision); infra note 60 (discussing Ziska decision).
13. Linderkamp v. Bismarck School Dist. No. 1, 397 N.W.2d 76, 79 (N.D. 1986); Zizka
v. Water Pollution Control Auth., 195 Conn. 682,
-, 490 A.2d 509, 513 (1985).
14. Linderkamp v. Bismarck School Dist. No. 1, 397 N.W.2d 76, 79 (N.D. 1986); Zizka
v. Water Pollution Control Auth., 195 Conn. 682,
-, 490 A.2d 509, 513 (1985).
15. See Bung's Bar & Grille, Inc. v. Florence Township Council, 206 N.J. Super. 432,
462, 502 A.2d 1198, 1214 (1985) (holding that state courts should hear § 1983 challenges to

local improvement assessments and award § 1988 attorneys' fees); see also Marx v. Truck
Renting and Leasing Ass'n, No. 57,130, slip op. at 2 (Miss. Sept. 30, 1987) (Robertson, J.,
concurring) (state court must accept and adjudicate state tax § 1983 claim); infra notes 46-52
and accompanying text (explaining Bung's court's reasoning in entertaining state tax § 1983
claim).
16. See infra notes 124-82 and accompanying text (analyzing purposes of Act and

concluding that state courts have duty to hear state tax § 1983 claims).
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Several state courts have considered the ability of plaintiffs challenging
state taxes to bring section 1983 claims. 7 Generally, state courts follow one
of three approaches to this question.18 In State Tax Commission v. Fondren
(Fondren I1)19 the Mississippi Supreme Court determined that the Act
precludes state courts from entertaining section 1983 suits (the preclusion
approach). 20 In Fondren v. State Tax Commission (Fondren 1) property
owners in various Mississippi counties sought to enjoin the Mississippi State
Tax Commission (Tax Commission) from approving the counties' assessment
rolls until the Commission equalized assessments among the counties. 2' The
Chancery Court of Hinds County, Mississippi, sustained the Tax Commission's demurrer to the plaintiffs' complaint and the plaintiffs appealed the
decision to the Mississippi Supreme Court. 22 The Mississippi Supreme Court
reversed and remanded the case, holding that the Mississippi statutes providing for an appeal of tax assessments did not afford the plaintiffs an
adequate remedy at law.23 After the supreme court's decision in Fondren I,
property owners in twelve other Mississippi counties filed in the chancery
court a similar complaint against the Tax Commission that also advanced
a section 1983 claim that enabled the plaintiffs to further request attorneys'

17. See supra note 10 (listing courts that have ruled on state court jurisdiction over state
tax § 1983 claims).
18. See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text (discussing state court disagreement
about state court jurisdiction over state tax § 1983 actions).
19. 387 So. 2d 712 (Miss. 1980) ( Fondren Ii).
20. State Tax Comm'n v. Fondren, 387 So. 2d 712, 723 (Miss. 1980) (Fondren II), cert.
denied sub nom, Redd v. Lambert, 450 U.S. 1040 (1981).
21. Fondren v. State Tax Comm'n, 350 So. 2d 1329, 1330 (Miss. 1977) (Fondren1).In
Fondren I the plaintiffs asserted that tax assessments in Mississippi were unequal among the
counties. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that various sections of the Mississippi Code charged the
State Tax Commission with the responsibility to equalize property assessments among Mississippi counties. Id; Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 27-35-113 - 117 (1972). The plaintiffs alleged that
section 112 of the Mississippi Constitution required that taxation be uniform and equal
throughout the state, that the state adopt general laws and uniform rules for property
assessment, and that the state assess taxes against property in proportion to the property's
true value. Fondren I, 350 So. 2d at 1330; Miss. CONsT. art. IV, § 112.
22. Fondren I, 350 So. 2d at 1332.
23. Id. In Fondren I the State Tax Commission claimed that the Mississippi statutory
remedy barred the plaintiffs' suit in equity. Id. at 1333. The Mississippi remedy provided that
if a Commission order assessing an ad valorem tax aggrieved any person, the aggrieved person
could appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals the amount of the tax. Id. The Commission offered
as evidence of the adequacy of the Mississippi statutory remedy Mississippi Code provisions
that provided methods for determining the proper assessment of a piece of property. Id. The
Mississippi Supreme Court noted that the plaintiff did not question the Commission's computation of the value of his property. Id. Rather, the plaintiff requested that-the court enjoin
the Commission from collecting taxes anywhere in the state until assessments throughout the
state were equal in compliance with the Mississippi Constitution. Id. The court stated that the
drafters of the Mississippi Code sections upon which the Commission relied intended the
sections to provide a procedure for a taxpayer to appeal the amount of an assessment, and
not to police the Commission's compliance with the Mississippi Constitution's requirement of
equal taxation. Id.
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fees pursuant to section 1988.24 The chancery court consolidated the suits
for trial (Fondren I).25 The chancery court granted the plaintiffs the
requested injunctive relief and attorneys' fees. 26 The Tax Commission appealed the chancery court's decision, asserting that the Tax Injunction Act
precluded the award of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. 27
In Fondren II, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the chancery
court's decision awarding attorneys' fees to the Mississippi property owners.n The supreme court rested its opinion on three premises. 29 First, the
court assumed that a plain, speedy, and efficient state procedure for the
appeal of state tax assessments satisfied the Act's requirement that an
adequate remedy be available in state court.30 The court noted that the

24. Fondren 11, 387 So. 2d at 714. In Redd v. State Tax Commission, which the chancery
court of Hinds County, Mississippi, consolidated with Fondren I for trial, the plaintiffs owned
taxable property in 12 Mississippi counties. Id. The complaint sought to enjoin the Tax
Commission's chairman and commissioners, and the Chiefs of the Ad Valorem and Equalization
Divisions of the Commission, from approving any county's assessment roll until the Commission
equalized the assessment rolls between the counties. Id. The Redd plaintiffs requested that the
Chancellor require the defendants to pay all of complainants' costs and expenses, including
attorneys' fees. Id.
25. Id.; see Fondren v. State Tax Comm'n, 387 So. 2d 713 (Miss. 1977) ( Fondren I1),
cert. denied sub nom, Redd v. Lambert, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981).
26. Id. In Fondren II the chancery court issued an injunction prohibiting the defendants
and their successors from accepting or approving the tax rolls or recapitulation reports of any
county unless the commissioners valued and assessed all property subject to ad valorem taxation
within the county at the property's true value. Id. Pursuant to section 1988 of the Civil Rights
Act, the Chancellor awarded plaintiffs attorneys' fees of $58,000. Id.; Civil Rights Attorneys'
Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
27. Fondren 11, 387 So. 2d at 722.
28. Id. at 723. In Fondren II the defendant appealed the Chancellor's decree on four
grounds. Id. at 722. First, the Commission asserted that the Chancellor lacked the authority
to require the Commission to equalize assessments between the counties of the state. Id. at
715. The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the Mississippi Code charged the Commission
with the responsibility to equalize assessments between counties. Id. at 719. The Mississippi
Supreme Court held that the Chancellor could require that the Commission execute its legal
duty to equalize assessments. Id. at 720. Second, the Commission argued that the law did not
require that the Commission assess property at its true value for taxation. Id. The Mississippi
Supreme Court rejected the Commission's argument and held that, although the assessed value
of property may be a percentage of its true value, the true value of the property must be the
basis of the Commission's assessment. Id. at 721. Third, the Commission asserted that the
plaintiffs had no standing to maintain a suit challenging the ad valorem tax assessments, and
that injunctive relief was not permissible. Id. at 723. The Mississippi Supreme Court held
that the court's decision in Fondren I answered affirmatively these questions. Id.; Fondren I,
350 So. 2d 1329 (Miss. 1977). Finally, the Commission argued that the Act barred the
Chancellor's award of attorneys' fees under section 1988 to the plaintiffs. Fondren II, 387 So.
2d 723. The Mississippi Supreme Court's consideration of the attorneys' fees award was the
only part in which the court addressed a state court's jurisdiction over state tax section 1983
claims. Id. at 723.
29. Fondren 11, 387 So. 2d at 722-23.
30. Id. at 723. In Fondren 11, without discussing the provisions of the Mississippi
remedy, the Mississippi Supreme Court noted that the procedural provisions of the Mississippi
remedy were adequate. Id.
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Mississippi appeal procedures for plaintiffs who challenge ad valorem tax
assessments were adequate.3' Second, the Fondren II court asserted that,
while state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over
section 1983 claims, state courts do not have superior jurisdiction over
section 1983 claims. 32 Last, the court explained that the Act requires a
plaintiff challenging a state tax to exhaust state remedies before pursuing a
section 1983 remedy. 33 Accordingly, the court found that, because the
plaintiffs failed to exhaust their state created remedies, the Act precluded
a federal court from hearing the plaintiffs' section 1983 claim. 34 Since a

state court's jurisdiction does not extend beyond a federal court's jurisdiction, the court found that a state court could not entertain the plaintiffs'
section 1983 claim. 3 Thus, the court held that the existence of an adequate
state remedy precludes a plaintiff's section 1983 claim in both federal and
state courts. 36 The court concluded that the Tax Injunction Act precluded
the plaintiffs from bringing a section 1983 claim in state court and from
37
recovering attorneys' fees under section 1988.

31. Id. at 723. In Fondren I1the Mississippi Supreme Court, in holding adequate the
Mississippi statutory remedy for plaintiffs challenging ad valorem tax assessments, relied on
the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Bland v. McHann.
Id. at 723; Bland v. McHann, 463 F.2d 21, 28 (5th Cir. 1972). In Bland a group of black
demonstrators in Edwards, Mississippi, filed suit in the federal district court alleging that state
and local officials unfairly had assessed plaintiffs' properties for tax purposes. Bland, 463
F.2d at 23. The plaintiffs alleged that state and local tax officials overassessed the plaintiffs'
properties in retaliation for the plaintiffs' peaceful demonstrations against local racial discrimination. Id. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi denied
the plaintiffs all relief on the merits and noted that a valid remedy was available to the
plaintiffs in state court. Id. The Mississippi remedy provided for notice to taxpayers that
officials had equalized tax rolls, a forum for taxpayers to air their objections to the tax and
for appeal to the Mississippi circuit court. See id. at 28 (discussing Mississippi statutory remedy
available to plaintiffs challenging state tax); Miss. CoNsr. ART. 4, § 112; Miss. CODE ANN.,
§§ 1147, 1340 (1972); id., §§ 3742-12, 3742-14, 3742-17 (1972). The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in part, reasoning that,
because the Mississippi remedy was plain, speedy, and efficient, the Tax Injunction Act
precluded the district court from entertaining the suit. Bland, 463 F.2d at 23.
32. Fondren 11, 387 So. 2d at 723.
33. Id. In Fondren lithe Mississippi Supreme Court determined that the Act distinguishes
state tax § 1983 cases from other § 1983 cases. Id. The court noted that generally, plaintiffs
need not exhaust state remedies before seeking relief under section 1983 in federal court. Id.;
see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) (holding that § 1983 plaintiffs need not exhaust
state remedies before bringing § 1983 action in federal court). However, the court reasoned
that the Act's bar on federal court jurisdiction over state tax challenges, whether or not a
plaintiff challenges a state tax under section 1983, required plaintiffs to exhaust state remedies.
Fondren 11, 387 So. 2d at 723.
34. Fondren II, 387 So. 2d at 723.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.The Mississippi Supreme Court recently held that the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Fair Assessment in Real Estate Association v. McNary overruled Fondren
11. See Marx v. Truck Renting and Leasing Ass'n, No. 57,130, slip op. at 8 (Miss. Sept. 30,
1987) (Robertson, J., concurring) (noting that majority of Marx court recognizes that Fair
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In Bung's Bar & Grille, Inc. v. Florence Township CounciP8 the Superior
Court of New Jersey expressly refused to follow the Fondren 11 court's

Assessment decision essentially overrules Fondren 11 decision); see also Fair Assessment in
Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 116 (1981) (holding that although Act bars in
federal court state tax § 1983 claim, plaintiffs can bring state tax § 1983 claim in Missouri
court); Fondren II, 387 So. 2d at 723 (holding that Act precludes in state court state tax §
1983 claim). Although the Mississippi Supreme Court in Marx recognized that FairAssessment
overruled Fondren II, the Fondren II decision provides a clear illustration of the preclusion
approach that some state courts have adopted in deciding whether state courts have jurisdiction
over state tax section 1983 challenges. See Fondren II, 387 So. 2d at 723 (outlining preclusion
approach that adequate state law remedy available to plaintiff precludes state tax § 1983 action
in state court); see also Backus v. Chilivis, 236 Ga. 500, 505, 224 S.E.2d 370, 374 (1976)
(holding that adequate remedy in state court precludes both state court and federal court
jurisdiction over taxpayer's claim under § 1983); Raschke v. Blancher, 141 Ill. App. 3d 813,
817, 491 N.E.2d 1171, 1174 (1986) (holding that taxpayers must exhaust available state
administrative remedies before bringing § 1983 action in state court). But see Marx v. Truck
Renting and Leasing Ass'n, No. 57,130, slip op. at 8 (Miss. Sept. 30, 1987) (Robertson, J.,
concurring) (noting that majority of Marx court recognizes that Fair Assessment decision
essentially overrules Fondren II decision).
In Backus v. Chilivis the plaintiffs instituted a class action suit challenging the validity of
the 1974 county ad valorem tax digest. Backus, 236 Ga. at 500, 224 S.E.2d at 371. Count
four of the plaintiffs' complaint sought money damages in tort from the company that prepared
the maps upon which the Brunswick, Georgia, tax officials based the tax digest. Id. at 503,
224 S.E.2d at 373. The court noted that the plaintiffs' claim for money damages correctly
alleged that the digest lacked the uniformity which the United States Constitution requires.
Id. at 503, 224 S.E.2d at 31. The court found, however, that the plaintiffs could appeal
the assessment of their property under the tax digest to the county board of tax equalization,
which could correct the tax digest. Id. The court held that the appeal process was plain,
speedy, and efficient, and therefore, the Act precluded federal court jurisdiction over the
plaintiffs' action. Id. at 505, 224 S.E.2d at 374.
In Raschke v. Blancher the taxpayers, who were farmers, brought a class action suit
against the tax officials in Henry County, Illinois, seeking damages under section 1983.
Raschke, 141 Ill. App. 3d at 814, 491 N.E.2d at 1172. The plaintiffs alleged that, in reassessing
the plaintiffs' farmland, farm improvements, and farm dwellings, the defendants violated the
plaintiffs' rights to equal protection under the laws which the federal Constitution guarantees.
Id. at 815, 491 N.E.2d at 1172. The court noted that section 1983 does not require a plaintiff
to exhaust other legal remedies, for example, state remedies, before pursuing a section 1983
suit in federal court (the nonexhaustion doctrine). Id. (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961)). The court explained, however, that the United States Supreme Court, in Fair Assessment in Real Estate Association v. McNary, held that application of the nonexhaustion doctrine
would be highly intrusive to state tax systems because the doctrine would enable plaintiffs to
pursue in federal court section 1983 challenges to state taxes without first having exhausted
state remedies for unfair tax assessments. Id. at 817, 491 N.E.2d at 1174; see Fair Assessment
in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 114 (1981). The Raschke court noted, therefore,
that the Court in Fair Assessment held that the nonexhaustion doctrine was inapplicable to
suits challenging state taxes under section 1983. Raschke, 141 Ill. App. 3d at 817, 491 N.E.2d
at 1174; see Fair Assessment, 454 U.S. at 114. Accordingly, in Raschke the Illinois Court of
Appeals held that, if the plaintiffs could not maintain in federal court a section 1983 action
alleging constitutional violations, the plaintiffs could not maintain in state court a section 1983
action without first exhausting state remedial procedures for challenging tax assessments.
Raschke, 141 Ill. App. 3d at 817, 491 N.E.2d at 1174.
38. 206 N.J. Super. 432, 502 A.2d 1198 (1985).
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preclusion approach.39 In Bung's landowners in Florence, New Jersey,
successfully challenged under state law and section 1983 a local improvement
assessment. 40 In setting aside the Township's assessment and reassessing the
plaintiffs' property, the court relied on New Jersey statutory and case law,
which allows taxpayers to appeal assessments for local improvements. 41 As
prevailing parties in the section 1983 challenge to the sewer assessment, the
plaintiffs moved that the court award attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs
pursuant to section 1988 and a New Jersey court rule, permitting a court
to award to the prevailing party attorneys' fees when a statute permits
courts to award counsel fees. 42 The defendant argued that, because an
adequate remedy was available to the plaintiffs under state law, the Act
precluded the plaintiffs' section 1983 claim. 43 The defendants argued further
that, if the Act prohibited the plaintiffs' section 1983 claim, the New Jersey
court rule could not resurrect the section 1983 claim and permit a section
1988 attorneys' fee award." The.Superior Court of New Jersey, however,
rejected the defendants' preclusion argument and awarded the plaintiffs
45
reasonable attorneys' fees under section 1988.

39. Bung's Bar & Grille, Inc. v. Florence Township Council, 206 N.J. Super. 432, 458,
502 A.2d 1198, 1213 (1985); see supra notes 19-37 and accompanying text (discussing the
Mississippi Supreme Court's preclusion approach).
40. Bung's, 206 N.J. Super. at 438, 502 A.2d at 1200. In Bung's the defendant adopted
a local improvement ordinance that appropriated money for the construction of water and
sewer improvements. Id. at 438, 502 A.2d at 1201. The ordinance provided that the landowners
benefitting from the proposed sewer improvements would pay for the improvements through
property assessments. Id. Upon completion of the improvements, the township clerk certified
the costs of the project to the assessment commission. Id. The assessment commission
determined the amounts that the town council would assess against the owners of the improved
properties for the sewer improvements. Id. The assessment commission submitted its proposed
assessments to the town council for approval. Id. The town council, however, remanded the
proposed assessments to the assessment commission because the total amount of the assessments
exceeded the amount that the improvement ordinance had appropriated for the improvements.
Id. After conducting hearings to determine a fair assessment, the assessment commission
submitted a new assessment proposal to the town council. Id. The town council approved the
new sewer assessments. Id. The plaintiffs challenged these assessments on statutory and
constitutional grounds. Id.
41. Id. at 439, 502 A.2d at 1201. In Bung's the New Jersey Superior Court did not
address the plaintiffs' federal civil rights claims in setting aside the Township's assessments of
the plaintiffs' property. Id. The court based its decision on New Jersey statutory law that
provided for taxpayers' appeals from assessments for local improvements and on New Jersey
case law. Id.; see McNally v. Teaneck, 132 N.J. Super. 442, 458-59, 334 A.2d 67, 76 (1975)
(holding that township's special assessment for street improvements violates statutory requirements unless commissioners determine that total cost will not exceed total enhancement value
and cost is fairly apportioned'among property owners), modified, 75 N.J. 33, 379 A.2d 446
(1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40-56-54 (Vest 1982) (providing taxpayers procedure under which
to appeal local assessments).
42. Bung's, 206 N.J. Super. at 438, 502 A.2d at 1201; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:429(a)(8) (1982).
43. Bung's, 206 N.J. Super. at 439, 502 A.2d at 1213.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 466, 502 A.2d at 1218.
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In rejecting the preclusion approach, the New Jersey Superior Court
noted that the legislative history of the Act demonstrated that Congress
46
intended the Act to limit federal court jurisdiction over state tax challenges.
The court discerned nothing in the legislative history of the Act, however,
suggesting that Congress intended the Act similarly to limit state court
jurisdiction. 47 The court observed that the preclusion approach closes all
forums to a taxpayer with a civil rights claim in a state tax challenge. 48 The
court reasoned, furthermore, that a state remedy is not plain, speedy, and
efficient unless the remedy permits a state court to hear a plaintiff's federal
and state claims.4 9 The court explained that, because the New Jersey remedy
allowed the plaintiffs to recover attorneys' fees, the New Jersey remedy was
an adequate remedy for the Act purposes.50 Although the court granted the
plaintiffs relief based on a New Jersey state created remedy, rather than on
the plaintiffs' section 1983 claim, the court awarded the plaintiffs reasonable
attorneys' fees pursuant to section 1988.51 Thus, the Bung's court held that

46. Id. at 458, 502 A.2d at 1214. In Bung's the New Jersey Superior Court reasoned
that the Fondren II court's preclusion approach rule prevented a taxpayer from obtaining
relief under § 1983 in a state tax challenge. Id.
47. Id. at 458, 502 A.2d at 1213. In Bung's the New Jersey Superior Court noted that
the Act had its roots in equity practice and in recognition of a state's need to administer its
own fiscal operations. Id. at 458, 502 A.2d at 1213-14 (citing Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank,
450 U.S. 503, 522-23 (1981)). The court noted that the Act was a vehicle for drastically limiting
federal district court jurisdiction over important local concerns such as the collection of state
taxes. Id. at 458, 502 A.2d at 1214; see infra notes 64-84 and accompanying text (discussing
legislative history of Act). The Bung's court observed that Congress' denial of jurisdiction to
federal district courts did not similarly deny state courts jurisdiction over state tax § 1983
claims. Bung's, 206 N.J. Super. at 458, 502 A.2d at 1214. The court believed that Congress
intended to place all state tax challenges in state court by denying jurisdiction to federal
courts. Id. Because New Jersey had not limited state court jurisdiction over state tax cases,
the Bung's court concluded that New Jersey courts had jurisdiction over § 1983 claims. Id.
48. Bung's, 206 N.J. Super.- at 460, 502 A.2d at 1214.
49. Id. at 460, 502 A.2d at 1215.
50. Id. at 461, 502 A.2d at 1215. In Bung's the New Jersey Superior Court relied on
the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Rosewell v. LaSalle National Bank and Fair
Assessment in Real Estate Association v. McNary in asserting that the availability in state
court of a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy requires joinder in state court of federal and
state law claims. Id.; see Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 514 (1980) (noting
that, while Act precludes federal court jurisdiction over plaintiff's state tax § 1983 claim,
plaintiff can pursue federal claims in state proceeding); Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n
v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 116 (1981) (noting that state supreme court had held that plaintiffs
could bring state tax § 1983 claims in state courts); infra notes 90-105 and accompanying text
(explaining Rosewell decision); infra notes 115-23 and accompanying text (discussing Fair
Assessment decision). The New Jersey court noted that neither the Fair Assessment decision
nor the Rosewell decision required a state court to permit joinder of federal and state law
claims. Bung's, 206 N.J. Super. at 461, 502 A.2d at 1215. The New Jersey court stated,
however, that nonjoinder of claims conflicted with the New Jersey rule of procedural efficiency.
Id.
51. Bung's, 206 N.J. Super. at 462, 502 A.2d at 1216. A federal court has held that
courts may award attorneys' fees to a prevailing plaintiff pursuant to section 1988 when the
plaintiff brings an action under section 1983 but prevails on a claim other than his section
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the Act encourages courts to entertain section 1983 cases challenging state
taxes and, when appropriate, to award attorneys' fees pursuant to section

1988.52
In Linderkamp v. Bismarck School District No. 153 the Supreme Court
of North Dakota considered and rejected both the preclusion approach and
the Bung's approach.- 4 The Linderkamp plaintiffs challenged the defendant
school district's practice of transferring money from the general fund to a

building fund and the district's use of "judgment funding" to levy additional
taxes to pay judgments in condemnation actions.5 5 The plaintiffs advanced

a section 1983 claim asserting that the defendants' transfers violated the
plaintiffs' substantive due process rights by excessively and unlawfully taxing
the plaintiffs. 56 The District Court of Burleigh County, North Dakota,

granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the issue of the
constitutionality of the transfers, but denied the plaintiffs' request under
section 1988 for attorneys' fees. 57 The plaintiffs appealed the trial court's
58
denial of attorneys' fees to the Supreme Court of North Dakota.

In Linderkamp the Supreme Court of North Dakota noted that the Tax

Injunction Act prohibits federal courts from hearing requests for injunctions
against state tax collection. 9 In rejecting the preclusion approach of Fondren
II and the Bung's approach, the court held that, although the Act does not

1983 claim. See Kimbrough v. Arkansas Activities Ass'n, 574 F.2d 423, 426 (8th Cir. 1978)
(finding footnote in House report on § 1988 that permits award of attorneys' fees when court
does not reach § 1983 issue). The House Judiciary Committee report on section 1988 explained
that, if a plaintiff prevailed on a nonconstitutional claim, the plaintiff could request the court
to determine whether the plaintiff would have prevailed on the plaintiff's constitutional claim.
H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 n.7 (1976). If the court determines that the
plaintiff would have prevailed on the constitutional claim, the court may award to the plaintiff
reasonable attorneys' fees. Id. In Kimbrough v. Arkansas Activities Association the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that, when a plaintiff's section 1983 claims
and his nonconstitutional claims arise out of a common nucleus of operative fact, a court
may award a prevailing plaintiff attorneys' fees even if the court declines to enter judgment
on the plaintiff's section 1983 claim. Kimbrough, 574 F.2d at 426.
52. Bung's, 206 N.J. Super. at 457-66, 502 A.2d at 1213-18.
53. 397 N.W.2d 76 (N.D. 1986).
54. Linderkamp v. Bismarck School Dist. No. 1, 397 N.W.2d 76, 79 (N.D. 1986); see
supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text (discussing preclusion approach, which states that
Act precludes state courts from hearing § 1983 challenges to state taxes); supra notes 46-52
and accompanying text (discussing Bung's approach, which states that Act encourages state
courts to hear state tax § 1983 claims).
55. Linderkamp, 397 N.W.2d at 77.
56. Id.
57. Id.at 78. In Linderkamp the District Court of Burleigh County, North Dakota,
enjoined the defendant district school board, from using judgment funding and transferring
general funds to a building fund in the future. Id. The trial court solely based the decision
on the North Dakota Declaratory Judgment Act. Id. Because the trial court based its holding
on a state statute and not on section 1983, the trial court held that the plaintiffs could not
recover attorneys' fees under section 1988. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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expressly preclude state courts from entertaining section 1983 actions challenging state taxes, the provisions of the Act should guide state courts in
exercising discretion to hear state tax section 1983 actions (the discretionary
approach).6 0 The court stated that a policy of federal deference to state
remedial procedures underlies the Act. 6' Therefore, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined that, when an adequate state remedy is available
to a plaintiff a state court should defer to state remedial procedures and
refuse to hear a section 1983 challenge to state taxes.6 2
Although state courts interpreting the Act have reached different conclusions on whether the Act permits taxpayers to challenge in state court
state taxes under section 1983, a review of the Act's legislative history, the

-, 490 A.2d
60. Id.; see Zizka v. Water Pollution Control Auth., 195 Conn. 682,
509, 513 (1985) (holding Act provides guidelines for state courts to follow in evaluating state
tax § 1983 claims). In Zizka v. Water Pollution Control Authority the Supreme Court of
Connecticut considered and rejected the Fondren II court's preclusion approach. Zizka, 195
Conn. at -, 590 A.2d at 513. In Zizka the defendant Water Pollution Control Authority
used a formula to calculate a sewer benefit assessment against all property within the sewer
district. Id. at , 490 A.2d at 510. The plaintiffs, property owners in Windham, Connecticut,
claimed that the benefit assessment violated the plaintiffs' rights to equal protection and due
-, 490 A.2d at 510. Accordingly, the
process of law under the federal constitution. Id. at
-, 490 A.2d at
plaintiffs sought relief in a Connecticut court under section 1983. Id. at
510. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' violations of the plaintiffs' federal constitutional
rights were actionable under section 1983 and requested damages, injunctive relief, and
attorneys' fees. Id. at -, 490 A.2d at 510. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim
because Connecticut law provided an exclusive administrative method for plaintiffs to challenge
sewer assessments and the Act precluded state court from entertaining a section 1983 claim
490 A.2d at 512. The Supreme Court of
-,
challenging a state or local tax. Id. at
490 A.2d at 512.
Connecticut affirmed the trial court's decision. Id. at -,
In affirming the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' claim, the supreme court rejected
the preclusion approach and held that, rather than an absolute jurisdictional bar, the Act's
remedial standard is a guideline for state courts to follow in determining whether the availability
490 A.2d at 513.
of a state remedy precludes a plaintiff's section 1983 claim. Id. at __,
The court assumed that a plain, speedy, and efficient state procedure for the appeal of taxes
satisfied the Act's requirement that an adequate remedy be available in state court. Id. at ,490 A.2d at 513; see Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 512 (1981) (holding that
state remedy must meet minimal procedural criteria to trigger Act's federal jurisdictional bar).
The Zizka court stated that the Act reflects the policy that federal courts should not interfere
with state tax collection. Zizka, 195 Conn. at -, 490 A.2d at 513. Thus, the court reasoned
that state courts should determine the adequacy of state remedies that are available to plaintiffs
-,
490 A.2d at 513. The court evaluated the Connecticut
challenging state taxes. Id. at
procedure for challenging state taxes and found that the remedy was plain, speedy, and
efficient. Id. at __, 490 A.2d at 514. Accordingly, the court concluded that the state remedy
, 490 A.2d at 514. The Zizka court
precluded a section 1983 action in state court. Id. at _
fashioned a discretionary approach for a state court to follow in considering the applicability
of the Act to state court jurisdiction over state tax section 1983 claims. Id. at -, 490 A.2d
at 513. Under the discretionary approach, if a state court finds that the state law remedy
available to a plaintiff challenging state taxes is plain, speedy, and efficient, the state court
should exercise its discretion and choose not to hear plaintiff's state tax section 1983 claim.
Id. at
-, 490 A.2d at 514.
61. Linderkamp v. Bismarck School Dist. No. 1, 397 N.W.2d. 76, 80 (N.D. 1986).
62. Id.
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United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Act and the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution suggests that, to afford taxpayers
an adequate forum for their constitutional claims against state tax officials,
63
state courts should hear state tax section 1983 actions. The legislative
history of the Act illustrates that Congress based the Act upon deference64
to state courts, in accordance with the policies of federalism and comity.

In 1937, Senator Bone of Washington introduced Senate Bill

1 5 5 1

,6

5

which

limited the jurisdiction of federal district courts in lawsuits relating to state
tax collection. 66 By limiting federal injunctions against state tax collection,
Congress hoped to prevent, nonresident taxpayers from avoiding or reducing
state tax liability. 67 Congress subsequently adopted Senate Bill 1551 as the
69
Tax Injunction Act. 68 Congress passed the Act for three reasons. First,
Congress passed the Act to limit federal courts' authority to issue injunctions

against state tax collection. 70 After qualifying for federal diversity jurisdic-

tion in its challenge to state tax assessments, a foreign corporation could

63. See infra notes 64-131 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of Act,
federal courts and United States Supreme Court's interpretation of Act, and Supremacy Clause
of United States Constitution).
64. Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 522 (1981) (noting that Act has roots
in recognition of states' need to administer its own fiscal operations); see S. REP. No. 1035,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937) (explaining need for Act); H.R. REP. No. 1503, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2 (1937) (same).
65. S.1551, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1. Senate Bill 1551 was a proposed amendment to
section 24 of the Judicial Code. See 2569 CONG. REc. 1415 (1937).
66. S. 1551, 75th Cong., IstSess. § 1. Congress based the Tax Injunction Act upon
section 16 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. See Hendricks, Federal Jurisdiction to Enjoin
Assessment of State Taxes under the Tax Injunction Act: Rosewell v. LaSalle National Bank,
35 TAx LAW 500, 500 (1982). The Judiciary Act barred federal courts from entertaining suits
in equity when a plaintiff could avail himself of a "plain, adequate and complete" remedy at
law. The Judiciary Act, 28 U.S.C. § 384 (repealed June 25, 1948). Cases that addressed section
16 stressed that, in applying extraordinary remedies for state tax systems, federal courts should
defer to state courts. See Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 525 (1932) (admonishing federal
courts to refrain from interfering with state tax systems); Boise Artesian Hot and Cold Water
Co. v. Boise City, 213 U.S. 276, 282 (1909) (same). In Matthews v. Rodgers the United States
Supreme Court held that federal courts should have a scrupulous regard for state government
independence and should be reluctant to interfere with state fiscal operations. Matthews, 284
U.S. at 525. The Court held that, when ordinary procedures could preserve a plaintiff's
federal rights, federal courts should deny injunctive relief. Id.; see Boise Artesian Hot and
Cold Water Co., 213 U.S. at 282 (affirming Matthews admofiition that federal courts not
interfere with state fiscal operations).
67. See 2569 CONG. REc. 1416 (1937) (explaining that Act aimed at nonresident taxpayers', especially foreign corporations, avoidance of state tax liability).
68. S.1551, 75th Cong., IstSess. § 1 (1937).
69. See S. REP. No. 1035, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1937) (outlining Congress' reasons
for passing Act); H.R. REP. No. 1503, 75th Cong., IstSess. 2 (1937) (same); see supra notes
64-69 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' rationale for passage of Act); infra notes
70-84 (same).
70. See 2569 CONG. REc. 1416 (1937) (explaining need for Act); see Taylor, supra note
6, at 430 n.88 (explaining that Congress passed Act to curtail federal courts' enjoining state
tax collection).
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obtain an injunction prohibiting the state from collecting the taxes during
the pendency of the lawsuit. 71 Federal injunctions prohibiting state tax
collection imposed a financial burden on states and municipalities because
the injunctions permitted the foreign corporations to delay payment of their
state taxes. 72 Thus, by enjoining state tax collection, federal courts imposed
a financial burden on state and local governments and forced them to
accept reduced tax payments rather than become embroiled in protracted
73
litigation.
Second, Congress passed the Act to equalize the treatment of residents
and nonresidents challenging state taxes. 74 Nonresident taxpayers challenging
state taxes had an advantage over resident taxpayers challenging state taxes
because nonresident taxpayers qualified for diversity jurisdiction and could
elect to sue in federal court, while resident taxpayers had to challenge state
75
taxes in state courts because they did not qualify for diversity jurisdiction.
Under the law of most states, taxpayers challenging state taxes had to pay
the tax first and then sue for a refund. 76 Nonresident taxpayers relying on
federal diversity jurisdiction, however, could obtain federal injunctions
prohibiting states from collecting the nonresidents' taxes during the federal
77
litigation of their claims.
Finally, Congress passed the Act to establish state courts as the primary
forum for lawsuits challenging state taxes. 78 Congress noted that challengers

71. See 2569 CONG. REc. 1415 (1937) (statement of Sen. Bone) (explaining procedure
that diverse plaintiffs challenging state taxes followed in federal court).
72. See infra note 73 (explaining burden that federal injunctions imposed on states and
municipalities).
73. 2569 CoNG. Rac. 1415 (1937) (statement of Sen. Bone). In the Senate debate of the
Act, Senator Bone of Washington State illustrated the financial problems resulting from federal
court injunctions preventing state tax collection, by explaining the case of the Northern &
Pacific Railway Company. Id. at 1416. Senator Bone explained that, in 1935 the Northern
& Pacific Railway Company owed the State of Washington $1,401,549.00 in taxes. Id. The
railway company refused to pay the tax and challenged $618,087.00 of the tax assessment in
a federal district court proceeding under diversity jurisdiction. Id. The federal court granted
the railway company an injunction prohibiting the state from collecting the railway company's
taxes while the suit was pending. Id. The state ultimately prevailed in the litigation. Id. The
railway, however, challenged the state tax assessment every year. Id. Each lawsuit could last
several years. Id. During the pendency of the railway company's 1935 suit, injunctions prevented
the state from collecting several millions of dollars of tax revenues. Id. The delay in collection
of state taxes imposed a financial burden on the state, which resulted in the state's accepting
an unfavorable settlement of tax assessments for the subsequent years, rather than the full
amount of the tax after several years of litigation. Id.
74. Id. at 1416-17.
75. Id.
76. See S. RaP. No. 1503, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937) (noting that most states require
taxpayers to pay tax under protest before suing for refund).
77. S. REP. No. 1035, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937).
78. Id.; see 2569 CONG. REc. 1417 (1937) (explaining need for state courts to be primary
forum for state tax challenges). In his introductory remarks about the Act, Senator Bone read
certain sections of the reports that the Committee on the Judiciary prepared for the Johnson
Act because he thought that the issues underlying both the Johnson Act and the Tax Injunction
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to state taxes were often in federal court because of diversity jurisdiction
rather than federal question jurisdiction. 79 The legislators reasoned that, if
a remedy available in state court were adequate to preclude federal jurisdiction under the Act, the state court remedy was adequate to protect a
plaintiff's federal rights.80 Congress noted that the United States Supreme
Court, on appellate review, could insure the protection of a plaintiff's
federal rights when reviewing the state decision on appealA' The legislative

reports to the Act emphasize that if the state court is unable to protect a
plaintiff's rights, the Act provides that the plaintiff can pursue his claim in

a federal forum. s2 Congress believed that the language of the Act guaranteed
to a plaintiff challenging a state tax a full hearing and judicial determination

of the controversy.

3

Therefore, -in enacting the Act, Congress merely

codified the federal courts' policy of deferring to state courts in challenges
to state taxes when the state courts adequately can protect plaintiffs'

constitutional rights.Y
The federal courts that have interpreted the Act explicitly have not
considered what effect the Act has upon state court jurisdiction over section
1983 challenges to state taxes. s Federal courts have interpreted the Act,
however, mandatorily to foreclose a federal court from granting any relief

when an adequate remedy is available in state court.8 6 Additionally, federal
courts have expanded the scope of the Act to preclude federal jurisdiction

over a case in which the plaintiff challenges state taxes and requests relief

Act were the same. Id. The Judiciary Committee's Johnson Act reports advocated permitting
state courts to try controversies arising under state laws, instead of permitting people who
happen not to be state citizens to petition federal courts. Id. The reports noted that challenges
to state taxes generally arise entirely out of controversies under state laws. -d. The reports
reasoned that, because challengers to state taxes raised issues of state law, state courts would
be the best forum to decide the issues. Id.; see Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 525 (1932)
(holding that federal courts should deny relief when state court could preserve plaintiff's
federal right).
79. 2569 CoNG. REc. 1417 (1937).
80. Id. at 1416.
81. S. RaP. No. 1035, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937).
82. Id.; H.R. RP No. 1503, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937).
83. See id. (stating that plain, speedy, and efficient state court remedy adequately would
protect plaintiff's rights in state tax challenges); H.R. RP. No. 1503, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1937) (same).
84. 2569 CoNG. Ric. 1416 (1937).
85. See Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 116 (1981)
(holding only that Missouri plaintiff could not pursue § 1983 claim for refund in federal court
because Missouri law provided adequate remedy).
86. See, e.g., Miller v. Bauer, 517 F.2d 27, 32 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding that to be
adequate, state remedy must protect plaintiffs' federal rights, but state remedy need not be
on parity with federal remedy); Bland v. McHann, 463 F.2d 21, 29 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding
that Act does not require state remedy to be as good as federal remedy), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 966 (1973); First United Methodist Church of Syracuse v. City of Syracuse, 489 F. Supp.
185, 188 (N.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that state court remedy need not be perfect to preclude
federal jurisdiction).
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other than an injunction. 7 In interpreting the Act, the United States Supreme
Court has emphasized that the Act requires state court remedies to meet
certain procedural, rather than substantive, criteria. 88 The Supreme Court
also has noted that the principles of federalism and comity, the bases of
the Act, coupled with the Act's jurisdictional bar, cause a conflict between
section 1983's guarantee of a federal forum and the Act's preclusion of a
federal forum. 8 9
In Rosewell v. LaSalle NationalBank9° the United States Supreme Court
emphasized the procedural focus of the Tax Injunction Act.9' In Rosewell,
the Court considered what type of remedy constitutes a plain, speedy, and
efficient remedy for the purposes of the Act.92 The plaintiff, a landowner
in Cook County, Illinois, sued the defendants, Cook County tax officials,
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
claiming that the defendant overassessed plaintiffs property for property
tax purposes. 93 The plaintiff claimed that, by unequally assessing property
in Cook County, the defendants deprived the plaintiff of her rights of equal
protection and due process, which the fourteenth amendment to the United

87. See Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293., 300 (1943) (holding
that Act prohibits federal courts from granting declaratory judgment in state tax challenge).
88. See Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 522 (1981) (holding that state
remedies must meet certain procedural criteria to invoke Act's jurisdictional bar); see infra
notes 90-105 and accompanying text (discussing United States Supreme Court's decision in
Rosewel).

89. See Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 116 (1981)
(holding that doctrine of comity and Act bar federal jurisdiction in state tax § 1983 claims);
infra notes 115-23 and accompanying text (discussing United States Supreme Court's decision
in FairAssessment).

90. 450 U.S. 503 (1981).
91. Id. at 527.
92. Id. at 505.

93. Id. at 506. In Rosewell the plaintiff was the trustee of a land trust for Patricia
Cook, the beneficial owner of a 22-unit apartment complex in a low-income area of Cook
County, Illinois, and the defendants were the Cook County treasurer and assessor. Id. at 505,
510 n.11. In Rosewell the plaintiff alleged that Cook's apartment complex in Cook County,
Illinois, had a fair market value of $46,000 as of January 1, 1977. Id. at 506. A Cook
County ordinance required that, for tax purposes, the county assess property at 33% of the
fair market value. Id. In 1977 the county assessor assessed the value of Cook's apartment
complex at S52,150, which resulted in a tax liability for Cook of $6,106.
Id. at 507. The
plaintiff claimed that 33% of the fair market value of Cook's property was $15,180, which
resulted in a tax liability of $1,775. Id. The plaintiff further alleged that the county assessor
knowingly adopted assessment policies that resulted in assessments within the county from 3%
to 973% of the fair market value of property. Id. Finally, the plaintiff alleged both that the
assessor knew that the plaintiff had appealed her tax assessments in 1974, 1975, and 1976,
and that the assessor, in retaliation for the plaintiff's appeals, had targeted Cook's property
for an overassessment of fair market value. Id.
Before instituting the federal lawsuit, the plaintiff appealed unsuccessfully to the Cook
County Board of Appeals for a reduction of the tax assessment, thus exhausting her administrative remedies. Id. at 508. The plaintiff's only recourse was to pay the tax and to sue for
a refund in state court. Id. The plaintiff refused to pay the tax because of- the state's two
year delay in refunding a taxpayer's tax. Id.
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States Constitution secures.9 4 The plaintiff claimed further that the Illinois
statutory remedy available to a taxpayer appealing an assessment, which
resulted in a two year delay in the taxpayer's receipt of the refund, with
no accrual of interest, was not plain, speedy, and efficient.9 5 Thus, the
plaintiff argued, that the state law remedy did not meet the plain, speedy,
and efficient requirement of the Tax Injunction Act, and the Act did not
96
foreclose the federal district court's jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's claim.
The defendants in Rosewell moved to dismiss the plaintiff's claims,
arguing that the Illinois procedure for the appeal of tax assessments provided
the plaintiff a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy.9 7 The defendants further
argued that, because the state remedy was plain, speedy, and efficient, the
Act barred the federal district court's jurisdiction.98 The district court agreed
with the defendants and dismissed the plaintiff's complaint explaining that
under the Act, the court lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims.9 On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed
the district court's decision, finding that the Act did-not -bar federal
jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims because the Illinois procedure for
taxpayers to recover wrongly collected taxes was not plain, speedy, and
efficient.' °o
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit's decision
in Rosewell and held that, if a state statute provides a taxpayer the
opportunity to raise in a state forum his federal constitutional objections
to a state tax, then the state provides a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy.' 0

94. Id. at 508, n.7 & 510. In Rosewell the plaintiff contended that, by requiring the
plaintiff to pay three and one half times the amount of taxes that plaintiff legally owed the
state, the defendant had deprived the plaintiff of her rights of equal protection and due
process, which the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution secures. Id. at
510; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
95. Rosewell, 450 U.S. at 510. In Rosewell the plaintiff claimed that the two year delay
in the refund process already had cost the plaintiff a large amount of money in the previous
three tax appeals that the plaintiff had filed against the assessor. Id.
96. Id. at 510.

97. Id. at 510-11.
98. Id. at 511.
99. Id.
100. Id. In Rosewell the United States Supreme Court evaluated the adequacy of the
Illinois state law remedy available to plaintiffs who wanted to challenge a state property tax.
Id. at 508 n.6. To challenge a property tax assessment, a Cook County property owner first
had to file a written complaint with the county assessor. Id.; see ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 120, §§
578, 594(1), 596-99, 675, 716 (1977) (outlining procedure available to taxpayers challenging
property tax assessment). After filing the written complaint, the taxpayer was entitled to a
hearing before the county assessor. Rosewell, 450 U.S. at 508 n.6. If the hearing afforded
no relief to the taxpayer, the taxpayer could appeal for the correction of the assessment to
the Board of Appeals of Cook County. Id. The Illinois law required that a taxpayer exhaust
all available administrative remedies before the taxpayer could seek a legal remedy in court.
Id. (citing People ex rel Korzen v. Fulton Mkt. Cold Storage Co., 62 11. 2d 443, 446-47, 343
N.E.2d 450, 452, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833 (1976)). Finally, under Illinois law the taxpayer
was required to pay the tax under protest and sue for a refund. Id. at 508 n.7.
101. Rosewell, 450 U.S. at 514. In Rosewell the United State Supreme Cogurt noted that
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The Court decided that the Act requires a procedural analysis, rather than
a substantive analysis, of remedies. 0 2 The Court noted that the Act creates
minimal procedural criteria that the state remedy must meet to trigger the
Act's bar of federal jurisdiction over a plaintiff's state tax claim. 03 The
Court held that as long as state court procedures for the appeal and refund
of wrongly collected taxes are plain, speedy, and efficient, the Act precludes
a federal court from hearing a suit challenging a state tax. 0 4 Thus, the
Court concluded that, because the Illinois tax appeals procedures permitted
the plaintiff to pursue her section 1983 claim in an Illinois forum, the
Illinois procedure was plain, speedy, and efficient and barred the Seventh
05
Circuit from hearing the plaintiff's claim.
Less than one year after Rosewell, in Fair Assessment in Real Estate
Association v. McNary'0 6 the United States Supreme Court recognized the
conflict between the immediate provision of a federal forum under section
1983 and the prohibition of a federal forum under the Act. °7 In Fair
Assessment the Court addressed the issue of whether a plaintiff who under
protest pays a local tax can maintain a refund suit and -a section 1983
damages action against state tax officials in a federal court. 0 The plaintiffs,
two real property owners and a nonprofit corporation comprised of taxpayers in St. Louis County, Missouri, claimed that the defendants, state
and municipal tax officials, unequally assessed real property in St. Louis
County. 0 9 The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants' unequal assessments

the Illinois procedures for refunds of illegally collected state taxes allowed a taxpayer to raise
all constitutional objections to the tax that a taxpayer might have. Id. The Court also stated
that a taxpayer could appeal the initial determination of his tax liability to higher Illinois
courts, and that review by the United States Supreme Court ultimately was available. Id.
102. Id. at 513. In Rosewell the United States Supreme Court looked closely at the
legislative history of the Act. Id. In examining the legislative history, the Court noted that the
House and Senate reports both emphasized that the Act assured that a plaintiff who raised a
constitutional question, such as a violation of equal protection actionable under section 1983,
would get a full hearing and judicial determination of his dispute. Id. Furthermore, the Court
noted that, in passing the Act, Congress emphasized that an appeal to the United States
Supreme Court was available to plaintiffs who raised a constitutional question in challenging
state taxes. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 516.
105. Id. Previous federal court decisions interpreting the Act supported the Court's holding
in Rosewell v. LaSalle National Bank that a plaintiff could assert any federal right in a state
court proceeding. See, e.g., Bland v. McHann, 463 F.2d 21, 24 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that
taxpayer may assert federal rights in state court), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 966 (1973); Advertiser
Co. v. Wallace, 446 F. Supp. 677, 681 (M.D. Ala. 1978) (holding that taxpayer can file in
state court § 1983 action raising all claims that taxpayer could raise in federal court); Czajkowski
v. Illinois, 460 F. Supp. 1265, 1272 (N.D.Ill. 1977) (holding that, although taxpayer asserts
federal statutory or constitutional rights, taxpayer must challenge state tax in state court),
aff'd, 588 F.2d 839 (1978).
106. 454 U.S. 100 (1981).
107. Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 101 (1981).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 105-06. In FairAssessment the plaintiffs challenged the assessment practices
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of county property violated the plaintiffs' federal constitutional rights of
equal protection and due process of law. 10 The plaintiffs paid the tax under
protest and filed a lawsuit in federal court seeking a refund of the tax and
requesting damages under section 1983 for the defendants' alleged violations
of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights."1 The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri held that the Act and the principle of
comity barred a federal court from hearing the plaintiffs' claims for a tax
refund and damages under section 1983.112 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in an equally divided decision, affirmed the
district court's decision against the plaintiffs." 3 The plaintiffs appealed the
4
decision of the Eighth Circuit to the United States Supreme Court."
In FairAssessment the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Eighth
Circuit's decision and held that the Act and the principle of comity preclude
5
a federal court from hearing a plaintiff's section 1983 damages action."
The Court analyzed the conflict between the jurisdictional provisions of the
Act and section 1983.116 The Court noted that section 1983 gives a civil
rights litigant immediate access to federal courts, without requiring that the
litigant exhaust his state remedies before instituting a lawsuit in federal
court." 7 The Court then discussed the pre-Act policy of federal court
noninterference with state tax systems, and the post-Act expansion of the
Act to cover more than just injunctive relief."' The Court stated that the
federal noninterference policy and the Act, both of which are based upon
the principle of comity, protect state tax systems from federal court inter-

of the county tax assessors, supervisors, director of revenue, and members of the Missouri
Tax Commission. Id. at 106. The plaintiffs alleged that, while the defendants assessed
properties with new improvements at 33% of current market value, the defendants assessed
properties without new improvements at only 22% of current market value. Id. Additionally,
the plaintiffs asserted that the defendants specifically targeted for reassessment property owners
who successfully had appealed property assessments. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 101-02.
113. Id. at 102.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 107. In Fair Assessment the United States Supreme Court specifically reserved
the question whether the Act precluded federal jurisdiction over state tax section 1983 claims.
Id.

116. Id. at 102.
117. Id. at 103-04; see McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 674 (1963) (holding
that plaintiffs filing § 1983 claims are entitled to federal forum); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167, 183 (1961) (holding that § 1983 authorizes immediate access to federal courts for civil
rights plaintiffs).
118. Fair Assessment, 454 U.S. at 107. Before Congress passed the Act, federal courts
followed a policy of equitable restraint in state tax matters. Id. at 108; see supra note 66
(discussing pre-Act federal court policy of equitable restraint). Because the policy of federal
court restraint did not prevent federal courts from interfering with state tax systems by granting
injunctive relief to challengers of state taxes, Congress passed the Tax Injunction Act. See
supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text (explaining Congressional intent underlying Act).
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The Court reasoned that Congress

intended the Act to permit state tax systems to operate with minimal
interference from federal courts. 20 The Court believed, however, that permitting the plaintiffs to bring their section 1983 claim in federal court would
require nearly every taxing official in the state to appear in federal court,

and thus would be no less disruptive of the Missouri tax system than an
injunction preventing state tax collection.1 2' Therefore, the Court held that
the principle of comity and the purposes of the Act override section 1983's
immediate provision of a federal forum to taxpayers asserting civil rights

claims against state officials.'2 The Court found that the Missouri remedy
was adequate to redress the plaintiffs' injuries and that the plaintiffs could

assert a section 1983 claim in the Missouri state courts.'2
In addition to the Act's legislative history's implication that the Act is

a tool to put all state tax claims in state court and the United States
Supreme Court's assumption that, in precluding under the Act federal

jurisdiction over state tax section 1983 claims, the plaintiffs can bring a
section 1983 claim in state court, the Supremacy Clause of the United States

Constitution may require state courts to entertain state tax section 1983
claims. 24 The Supremacy Clause requires state judges to uphold the federal
constitution and laws. 25 The United States Supreme Court has held that
state courts have a duty to enforce federally created rights. 26 Therefore, if

a plaintiff bases a state law claim and a federal law claim upon the same

119. Fair Assessment, 454 U.S. at 112.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 113-14. In Fair Assessment the United States Supreme Court explained that
a federal court section 1983 claim would require the defendants, who were nearly every key
tax official in St. Louis County, Missouri, to appear in federal court every time a taxpayer
appealed an assessment. Id. at 114. Furthermore, the Court noted that the tax policies which
the plaintiffs challenged were probably beyond the control of any one tax official. Id. The
Court decided that holding an individual official liable for an unconstitutional assessment
effectively would suspend state tax collection. Id. at 115. The Court concluded that, by
forcing plaintiffs to assert their state tax section 1983 claims in state, rather than federal
courts, the Act prevented the suspension of state tax collection. Id.
122. Id. at 116.
123. Id.
124. See Marx v. Truck Renting & Leasing Ass'n, No. 57,130, slip op. at 2-3 (Miss. Sept.
30, 1987) (Robertson, J., concurring) (arguing that Supremacy Clause requires state courts to
entertain § 1983 claims); Taylor, supra note 6, at 421 (stating that Supremacy Clause requires
state courts to entertain § 1983 claims); see infra notes 125-31 (discussing Supremacy Clause).
125. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution provides that the federal Constitution and laws are the supreme law of the land
and that state judges are bound to uphold the federal Constitution and laws, notwithstanding
any conflict with state law. Id.
126. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947) (overruling Rhode Island Supreme Court's
affirmation of trial court's refusal to entertain plaintiff's action under federal Emergency Price
Control Act); McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230, 234 (1934) (holding that state
may not discriminate against federal rights); Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 223
U.S. 1, 57 (1912) (rejecting under Supremacy Clause state court's contention that state court
could choose not to entertain federal cause of action that conflicted with state policy).
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facts and the claims encompass similar issues, if the state court has jurisdiction under local law to hear the state action, the state court may not
refuse to hear the federal claim. 127 The Supreme Court suggests that, absent
a procedural or jurisdictional reason for refusing to entertain a section 1983
claim, a state court may not refuse to hear the claim. 28 When a state court
hears a plaintiff's nonfederal state tax claims, essentially, the state court
29
admits that it has jurisdiction adequate to dispose of state tax claims.
Thus, unless state courts that refuse to hear state tax section 1983 actions

are correct in claiming that the Act provides state courts with a neutral
jurisdictional ground for refusing to hear state tax section 1983 claims, state

courts must hear these claims.

30

The United States Supreme Court, however,

has reserved the question whether state courts must entertain section 1983
3
claims.' '
Although the legislative history, the judicial interpretation of the Act,

and the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution indicate that
state courts must hear section 1983 claims, the question remains whether

the Act affects state court jurisdiction over state tax section 1983 challenges.
State courts that rely on the preclusion approach deny a forum to plaintiffs

who raise constitutional claims about state taxes, do not further the policies
underlying the Act, and frustrate the reasoning behind the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Act. 32 In passing the Act, Congress
intended to protect state tax systems from federal interference and insure
equal treatment of resident and nonresident taxpayers challenging local

127. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947) (overruling Rhode Island Supreme Court's
affirmation of trial court's refusal to entertain, plaintiff's action under federal Emergency Price
Control Act); McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230, 234 (1934) (holding that state
may not discriminate against rights arising under federal laws); Mondou v. New York, N.H.
& H. R.R., 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912) (rejecting under Supremacy Clause state court's contention
that state court could choose not to entertain federal cause of action that conflicted with state
policy); see also Marx v. Truck Renting & Leasing Ass'n, No. 57,130, slip op. at 7-8 (Miss.
Sept. 30, 1987) (Robertson, J., concurring) (arguing that state courts must hear state tax §
1983 claims); Taylor, supra note 6, at 421 (analyzing United States Supreme Court decisions
to require state court jurisdiction over general § 1983 claims).
128. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. at 394 (holding that state court with jurisdiction under
local law adequate to hear state law actions similar to federal action cannot refuse to enforce
federal action); McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230, 234 (1934) (holding that
state courts cannot discriminate against federal causes of action); Mondou v. New York, N.H.
& H R.R., 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912) (holding that state courts must enforce federal claims even
when federal claim conflicts with state policy); see Taylor, supra note 6, at 423 & n.51
(describing conditions under which state court can refuse to hear general § 1983 claim).
129. See Taylor, supra note 6, at 435 (explaining that state courts hearing state tax
challenges under state law admit competence to hear state tax § 1983 claim).
130. See Taylor, supra note 6, at 423, 435 (arguing that state courts hearing state law
challenges to state taxes must accept jurisdiction over state tax § 1983 claims).
131. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 n.7 (1980); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S.
1, 3 n.1 (1980).
132. See infra notes 133-50 and accompanying text (analyzing preclusion approach in
context of legislative history of Act, United States Supreme Court's interpretation of Act, and
Supremacy Clause).
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taxes.'33 The preclusion approach neither furthers nor hinders these two
purposes. State courts that follow the preclusion approach, however, undermine one of Congress' reasons for passing the Act. 3 4 Congress' third
reason for passing the Act was to make state courts the principle forum
for state tax challenges, while guaranteeing that a plaintiff's claim receives
a full hearing.3 5 A plaintiff's section 1983 claim is an important part of a
plaintiff's state tax challenge. 3 6 Because the tax refund that a plaintiff
would receive may be nominal, the availability of a section 1983 claim and
the possibility of recovering attorneys' fees under section 1988 often make
the challenge to state taxes feasible. 3 7 Because the Act prevents state tax
plaintiffs from pursuing a'section 1983 claim in federal court, the preclusion
approach denies state tax plaintiffs a full hearing of their state tax challenge. 38 Thus, by reading the Act to prevent a state court from adjudicating
a plaintiff's section 1983 claim, preclusion approach courts undermine
Congress' intent to guarantee that plaintiff's tax claims receive a full
hearing. 139
The courts adhering to the preclusion approach also frustrate the
reasoning behind the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Act in Rosewell and Fair Assessment.' 4° In Rosewell, the Supreme Court
held that, if state tax appeal procedures adequately protect a plaintiff's

133. See 2569 CoNG. REc. 1415-16 (1937) (explaining that purpose of Act is to prevent
nonresident taxpayers' use of federal injunctions to manipulate state tax systems); supra notes
64-84 and accompanying text (discussing Congressional intent to protect integrity of state tax
system).
134. See 2569 CONG. REc. 1415-16 (1937) (stating Congress passed Act to make state
courts principal state tax challenge forum); infra notes 132-50 and accompanying text (analyzing
preclusion approach).
135. See 2569 CONG. REc. 1416 (1937) (explaining need to make state courts principal
forum for state tax challenges); supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text (discussing Congressional intent in passing Act).
136. See Taylor, supra note 6, at 427 (discussing need for state courts to hear state tax
§ 1983 claims); supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text (discussing need for state court
jurisdiction over state tax § 1983 claims).
137. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text (discussing need for attorney's fees in
state tax litigation).
138. See Taylor, supra note 6, at 417 (arguing that result of state court denial of state
tax § 1983 claims is denial of full hearing to state tax § 1983 claims).
139. See Taylor, supra note 6, at 414 (discussing need for state courts to hear state tax
§ 1983 claims); supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text (discussing need for state court
jurisdiction over state tax § 1983 claims); supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text (discussing
legislative intent behind Act).
140. See Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 514 (1981) (holding that, while
Act precludes federal court jurisdiction over plaintiff's state tax § 1983 claim, plaintiff can
pursue state tax § 1983 claim in state proceeding); Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v.
McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 116 (1981) (same); supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text (discussing
United States Supreme Court's holding in Rosewel); supra notes 115-23 and accompanying
text (discussing United States Supreme Court's holding in Fair Assessment); see also infra
notes 141-50 and accompanying text (discussing how preclusion approach contradicts United,
States Supreme Court's assumptions in Rosewell and Fair Assessment).
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federal rights, the state tax remedy is plain, speedy, and efficient. 141 Preclu42
sion approach courts first evaluate the adequacy of state tax procedures.
If the procedures are plain, speedy, and efficient, preclusion approach
courts hold that a plaintiff cannot pursue in state court his section 1983
claim. 143 Typically, if a plaintiff cannot pursue in state court his section
1983 claim and recover attorneys' fees under section 1988, the plaintiff
cannot afford to bring his state tax claim.' 44 Thus, by barring state court
jurisdiction over a plaintiff's section 1983 claim, preclusion approach courts
effectively prevent a plaintiff from pursuing in state court his state tax
claims. 45 In FairAssessment the Supreme Court held that the principle of
comity and the Act preclude federal court jurisdiction in state tax section
1983 lawsuits.'" Under the principle of comity, which is the basis of the
Act, the federal government, out of deference to state governments, recognizes that a state should administer state governmental affairs, such as
tax systems. 47 Thus, courts following the preclusion approach undermine
the principle of comity and the purposes of the Act by interpreting the Act
to prevent state courts from adjudicating state tax section 1983 claims.'4
In Rosewell and FairAssessment, the Court assumed that a plaintiff could

141. Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 514 (1981); supra notes 101-05 and
accompanying text (discussing Rosewell definition of plain, speedy, and efficient).
142. See Backus v. Chilivis, 236 Ga. 500, 505, 224 S.E.2d 370, 374 (1976) (holding state
procedure, which allowed plaintiffs to appeal tax assessments to county board of appeals, was
plain, speedy, and efficient); Raschke v. Blancher, 141 Ill. App. 3d 813, 817, 491 N.E.2d
1171, 1174 (1986) (holding that plaintiff must exhaust state remedial procedures before
instituting § 1983 action); State Tax Comm. v. Fondren, 387 So. 2d 712, 723 (Miss. 1980)
(Fondren 11) (holding that state tax appeal procedures are plain, speedy, and efficient), cert.
denied sub nom, Redd v. Lambert, 450 U.S. 1040 (1981); supra note 31 (discussing Fondren
II court's analysis of Mississippi remedy); supra note 37 (discussing Backus and Raschke
courts' reasoning in developing discretionary approach).
143. See Fondren II, 387 So. 2d at 723 (holding that plain, speedy, and efficient state
court remedy precludes plaintiff's pursuit of state tax § 1983 claim); see notes 28-37 and
accompanying text (explaining Fondren 1I court's reasoning in precluding state tax § 1983
claim in state court).
144. See Taylor, supra note 6, at 416-17 (explaining that inability to recoup attorney's
fees prevents plaintiffs from bringing state tax challenges); supra notes 6-8 and accompanying
text (explaining need for § 1988 attorneys' fees awards in state tax challenges).
145. See Taylor, supra note 6, at 416-17 (explaining need for courts to award § 1988
attorneys' fees in state tax litigation); supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text (demonstrating
that state tax challenges are feasible only if plaintiff can recover attorneys' fees).
146. See Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary 454 U.S. 100, 107 (1981)
(holding that doctrine of comity and Act preclude federal jurisdiction over state tax § 1983
claims); supra notes 115-23 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's holding in
FairAssessment).
147. See BLACK's LAw DIcTONARY 242 (5th ed. 1979) (defining comity); FairAssessment,
454 U.S. at 112 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971)) (holding that equitable
restraint bars federal courts from enjoining pending state criminal prosecutions except under
extraordinary circumstances).
148. See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text (explaining how comity and Act's
basis in -federalism allow state courts to decide all aspects of state tax challenges).
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Preclusion approach

courts fail to take advantage of the Supreme Court's recognition of the
independence of state courts and state courts' competence to adjudicate
150
section 1983 actions.

Another possible approach that state courts can adopt in analyzing the

Act's impact on state court jurisdiction over state tax section 1983 claims
is the discretionary approach.' 5' Although the discretionary approach recognizes the independence and competence of state courts more than does
the preclusion approach, the discretionary approach also misinterprets the
purposes of the Act. 52 Discretionary approach courts recognize that the Act
does not preclude state courts from hearing a plaintiff's section 1983
claims.' 53 Discretionary approach courts interpret the Act, however, as giving
state courts the discretion to determine whether to exercise jurisdiction over
a plaintiff's section 1983 claim. 154 If state law provides a plain, speedy, and
efficient remedy in state courts, discretionary approach courts hold that
state courts should defer to state remedies and refuse to hear section 1983
claims. 155 Under the Act, a plaintiff may not assert in federal court a state
149. Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 514 (1981); FairAssessment, 454 U.S.

at 116; see supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing United States Supreme Court's
assumption in Rosewell that plaintiff could bring state tax § 1983 action in state forum); supra
notes 121-23 and accompanying text (discussing United Supreme States Court's assumption in
FairAssessment that plaintiff can pursue state tax § 1983 claim in state forum).
150. See Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 514 (1981) (holding that state
court is competent to hear plaintiff's state tax § 1983 claim); Fair Assessment in Real Estate
Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 116 (1981) (holding that plaintiff may pursue state tax § 1983
claim in state court); see supra notes 105 and accompanying text (discussing United States
Supreme Court's holding in Rosewell that plaintiff could bring state tax § 1983 claim in state
court); see supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text (discussing United States Supreme
Court's holding in Fair Assessment that federal courts should defer to state courts in state tax
matters).
151. See supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text (discussing discretionary approach).
152. See infra notes 153-66 and accompanying text (analyzing discretionary approach).
153. See Zizka v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 195 Conn. 682,
-, 490 A.2d
509, 513 (1985) (explaining that state courts should use Act as guideline in determining whether
to entertain state tax § 1983 challenges); Linderkamp v. Bismarck School Dist. No. 1, 397
N.W.2d 76, 79 (N.D. 1986) (holding that Act provides guideline for state courts in fashioning
jurisdictional bar similar to Act); supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text (discussing discretionary approach).
154. See Zizka v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 195 Conn. 682, -,
490 A.2d
509, 513 (1985) (holding that state courts can exercise discretion in deciding whether to entertain
state tax § 1983 claims); Linderkamp v. Bismarck School Dist. No. 1, 397 N.W.2d 76, 79
(N.D. 1986) (holding that Act provides guideline for state courts in fashioning jurisdictional
bar similar to Act); supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text (discussing discretionary approach).
155. See Zizka v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 195 Conn. 682,
-, 490 A.2d
509, 513 (1985) (holding that state courts should refuse to entertain state tax § 1983 claims in
deference to adequate state remedies); Linderkamp v. Bismarck School Dist. No. 1, 397
N.W.2d 76, 80 (N.D. 1986) (holding that state courts should impose limitations under state
law upon state tax § 1983 actions even though Act does not preclude state court jurisdiction);
supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text (discussing Linderkamp and Zizka courts' reasoning
in adopting discretionary approach).
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tax claim, even if the plaintiff asserts a section 1983 claim in conjunction
with the state tax claim. 56 By thus prohibiting federal jurisdiction over state
tax claims, Congress established state courts as the primary forum for state
tax challenges. 57 Congress believed that a plaintiff would be able to bring
both his federal and state claims in state courtJ 58 Thus, discretionary
approach courts that develop jurisdictional bars to state tax section 1983
claims prevent a plaintiff from asserting all of his state tax claims in state
courts, thereby undermining the Congressional intent underlying the Act. 59
Courts following the discretionary approach also ignore the United
States Supreme Court's reasoning in Rosewell and Fair Assessment.16 In
Rosewell the Supreme Court determined that the existence of adequate state
procedures for the appeal of tax assessments prevents a plaintiff from
bringing a section 1983 claim in federal court.' 6' In evaluating the adequacy
of the state remedy, the Court noted that the plaintiff could pursue his
state tax section 1983 claim in state court. 62 In FairAssessment the Supreme
Court held that, when the state remedy is adequate, allowing federal courts
to exercise jurisdiction over a state tax section 1983 refund suit would
interfere with state tax systems equally as would allowing federal courts to
issue injunctions against state tax collection. 63 In both situations, a federal
court's exercise of jurisdiction over the state tax case hales state tax officials
156. See Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 113 (1981)
(explaining conflict between Act and § 1983); supra notes 115-23 and accompanying text
(discussing Supreme Court's reasoning in FairAssessment that Act overrides § 1983's immediate
provision of federal forum).
157. See S. RE'. No. 1035, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1937) (discussing Congress' reasons
for making state courts primary forum for state tax challenges); supra notes 78-84 and
accompanying text (discussing Congress' intention to establish state courts as primary forum
for state tax challenges).
158. See id. (explaining Congressional belief that Act assures plaintiff full hearing of state
tax claims).
159. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of Act
and Congressional intent to make state court primary forum for state tax challenges).
160. See Zizka v. Water Pollution Control Auth., 195 Conn. 682, -, 490 A.2d 509,
513 (1985) (barring plaintiff's state tax § 1983 claim because of adequate state law remedy);
Linderkamp v. Bismarck School Dist. No. 1, 397 N.W.2d 76, 80 (N.D. 1986) (barring
plaintiff's state tax § 1983 claim in state court); see also Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450
U.S. 503, 514 (1980) (noting that plaintiff could pursue state tax § 1983 claim in state court);
FairAssessment, 454 U.S. at 116 (finding state court competent to hear plaintiff's state tax §
1983 claim); supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing United State Supreme Court's
assumption in Roseivell that plaintiff could bring state tax § 1983 action in state forum); supra
notes 121-23 and accompanying text (discussing United States Supreme Court's assumption in
FairAssessment that plaintiff can pursue state tax § 1983 claim in state court).
161. Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 514 (1980); see supra notes 100-05
and accompanying text (discussing United States Supreme Court's holding in Rosewelo.
162. Rosewell, 450 U.S. at 514; see supra notes 90-105 and accompanying text (noting
United States Supreme Court's statement in Rosewell that plaintiff could pursue state tax §
1983 claim in state court).
163. Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 113 (1981); see
supra note 121 and accompanying text (discussing how federal court, by exercising jurisdiction
over state tax § 1983 claims, interferes with state tax systems).
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into federal court, thus interfering with state tax systems in violation of the
principle of comity. 164 The Court in Fair Assessment held, however, not
that section 1983 was too intrusive to state tax collection, but rather that
plaintiffs could bring a section 1983 action in state court. 165 Therefore, state
courts that develop jurisdictional bars to state tax section 1983 claims
invalidate the Supreme Court's assumptions about the availability of state
courts to the plaintiffs in Rosewell and FairAssessment.'"
The New Jersey Superior Court approach in Bung's to state tax section
1983 claims is the approach that best carries out the purposes of the Tax
Injunction Act. 67 In Bung's the New Jersey Superior Court held that a
state court remedy is plain, speedy, and efficient only if the remedy permits
joinder of federal and state claims. 68 Congress passed the Act believing
69
that state courts should adjudicate all aspects of state tax challenges.

Congress believed that the Act's requirement of a plain, speedy, and efficient
state law remedy would insure that every plaintiff receives a full hearing of

his claim.

70

When a plaintiff raises both federal and state claims in a state

tax challenge, the New Jersey court's approach allows state courts to
adjudicate the entire controversy. 171 The New Jersey court reasoned that
state courts should not interpret the Act to deny civil rights plaintiffs a

164. See FairAssessment, 454 U.S. at 115-16 (explaining that state tax § 1983 damages
actions and federal injunctions against state tax collection equally are intrusive to state tax
systems).
165. Fair Assessment, 454 U.S. at 116; see supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text
(discussing United States Supreme Court's assumption in FairAssessment that plaintiff could
bring state tax § 1983 claim in state court).
166. See Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 514 (1981) (noting that plaintiff
can bring state tax § 1983 claim in state court even though Act barred claim in federal court);
Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 116 (1981) (noting state court
availability for plaintiff's state tax § 1983 claim in holding that Act barred plaintiff's qlaim);
see supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing United States Supreme Court's assumption
in Rosewell that plaintiff could bring state tax § 1983 action in state forum); supra notes 12123 and accompanying text (discussing United Supreme States Court's assumption in Fair
Assessment that plaintiff can pursue state tax § 1983 claim in state forum).
167. See infra notes 168-77 and accompanying text (discussing how New Jersey court's
interpretation of Act's affect on state court jurisdiction best follows Congressional intent in
enacting Act and United States Supreme Court's interpretation of Act).
168. Bung's Bar & Grille, Inc. v. Florence Township Council, 206 N.J. Super. 432, 460,
502 A.2d 1198, 1215 (1985); see supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text (discussing Bung's
court's decision to hear state tax § 1983 claim).
169. See S. RaP. No. 1035, 75th Cong., IstSess. 2 (1937) (explaining Congress' intent in
passing Act was to make state courts principal forum for state tax challenges); supra notes
78-84 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' intention to make state court primary state
tax challenge forum).
170. See S. RP. No. 1035, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937) (insuring that Act will deprive
no plaintiff of equitable right or full hearing of claim).
171. See Bung's, 206 N.J. Super. at 460, 502 A.2d at 1215 (explaining how New Jersey
state courts required to hear federal claims to insure full hearing of -controversy); supra notes
46-52 and accompanying text (discussing Bung's court's recognition of need for joinder of
federal and state claims in state court).
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forum for their state tax claims. 72 Accordingly, the New Jersey court's
approach promotes Congress' reasons for passing the Act, establishing state
courts as the principal forum for state tax challenges while guaranteeing
plaintiffs a forum for their claims.
The New Jersey court's approach in Bung's also best conforms to the
expectations of the United States Supreme Court in Rosewell and Fair
Assessment. 73 In both Rosewell and Fair Assessment the Supreme Court
held that plaintiffs could not maintain a state tax section 1983 claim in
federal court partly because the plaintiffs could pursue the section 1983
claim in state forums. 74 The New Jersey court's approach allows plaintiffs,
whom the Act prevents from petitioning federal courts for relief, to obtain
relief in state courts. 7 5 The New Jersey court held that, when a state remedy
does not permit plaintiffs to adjudicate their state and federal claims in one
proceeding, the state remedy is not adequate. 76 Thus, by allowing state tax
plaintiffs to raise all claims in a state tax forum, the New Jersey court
validates the United States Supreme Court's assumptions in Rosewell and
77
FairAssessment.
The Tax Injunction Act is a limitation on federal jurisdiction only and
encourages state courts to exercise jurisdiction over state tax section 1983

172. See Bung's, 206 N.J. Super. at 460, 502 A.2d at 1215 (reasoning that purpose of
Act could not be to deny civil rights plaintiffs forum for their claims); supra notes 46-52 and
accompanying text (discussing Bung's court's reasoning in hearing state tax § 1983 claim).
173. See Fair Assessment in Real Estate v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 116 (1981) (noting
that state law allows plaintiff to pursue state tax § 1983 claim in state court); Rosewell v.
LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 514 (1980) (stating that plaintiff can pursue state tax §
1983 claim in state court); see supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing United State
Supreme Court's assumption in Rosewell that plaintiff could bring state tax § 1983 action in
state forum); supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text (discussing United Supreme Court's
assumption in FairAssessment that plaintiff can pursue state tax § 1983 claim in state forum).
174. Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 116 (1981); Rosewell
v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 514 (1980); see supra note 105 and accompanying text
(discussing United States Supreme Court's assumption in Rosewell that plaintiff could bring
state tax § 1983 action in state forum); supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text (discussing
United Supreme Court's assumption in FairAssessment that plaintiff can pursue state tax §
1983 claim in state forum).
175. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text (explaining that approach of New
Jersey court guarantees to plaintiffs forum for their state tax § 1983 claims).
176. Bung's Bar & Grille, Inc. v. Florence Township Council, 206 N.J. Super. 432, 461,
502 A.2d 1198, 1215 (1985); see supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text (discussing Bung's
court's reasoning in hearing state tax § 1983 claim and problem of adequate state remedy).
177. See Bung's, 206 N.J. Super. at 459, 502 A.2d at 1214 (allowing state tax plaintiffs
to raise both federal and state challenges to state tax in state court); see also Rosewell v.
LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 514 (1981) (noting that plaintiff could pursue state tax §
1983 claim in state forum); Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100,
116 (1981) (finding that state court available for plaintiff's state tax § 1983 claim); supra notes
46-52 and accompanying text (discussing New Jersey court's provision of forum to state tax
§ 1983 claims); supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing United States Supreme
Court's assumption in Rosewell that plaintiff could bring state tax § 1983 action in state
court); supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text (discussing United Supreme Court's assumption in FairAssessment that plaintiff can pursue state tax § 1983 claim in state forum).
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claims. 178 A state tax plaintiff's ability to challenge in state court an allegedly
unconstitutional state tax often hinges on the plaintiff's prospects of recovering attorneys' fees under section 1988.179 State courts that refuse to hear
state tax section 1983 claims effectively prevent these plaintiffs from challenging unconstitutional taxation. 80 The Tax Injunction Act does not limit
or suggest a limit on a state court's jurisdiction over state tax section 1983
claims. 81 Accordingly,- the Act is not a neutral jurisdictional reason for
state courts to refuse state tax section 1983 claims.18 2 Thus, state courts
have a duty, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution, to hear state tax section 1983 claims and award section 1988
attorneys' fees to successful plaintiffs.
ANNE R. YTJENGERT

178. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' intent, in name
of federalism, to make state courts primary state tax forum); supra notes 115-23 and accompanying text (discussing United States Supreme Court's analysis in FairAssessment of Act's
basis in federalism and comity); supra notes 167-177 and accompanying text (analyzing New
Jersey court's approach in light of legislative history of Act and case law).
179. See Taylor, supra note 6, at 427 (discussing need for mandatory state court jurisdiction
over state tax § 1983 claims); supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text (same).
180. See Taylor, supra note 6, at 416-17 (discussing need for availability of attorneys'
fees in state tax litigation to offset prohibitive cost of litigation); supra notes 6-8 and
accompanying text (same).
181. See supra notes 167-77 and accompanying text (discussing New Jersey court's approach, which reads Act to encourage state court jurisdiction over state tax § 1983 claims).
182. See Taylor, supra note 6, at 423 (stating conditions under which state court can
refuse to hear general § 1983 claim); supra notes 123-31 and accompanying text (explaining
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of Supremacy Clause and state courts' discretion
to refuse to adjudicate federal claims).

To commemorate his retirementfrom the United States Supreme Court,
the Editorial Board of the Washington and Lee Law Review respectfully
dedicates this issue to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
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